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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
Jurisdiction in this appeal is granted by the provisions of 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(g) Utah Code Annotated, 1986, which provides 
in part that ,fthe Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including. . .appeals from District Court involving domestic 
relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce. 
." This is an appeal from the decree of divorce entered December 
18, 1987 in the Third District Court in and for Tooele County, 
the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES RESPONDED TO ON APPEAL 
1v Whether the District Court abused its discretion when 
it awarded the plaintiff child support of $87 per child per month 
for each of the four children of the marriage, when the defendant 
had no employment and no source of income? 
2. Whether the District Court erred in using the 
defendant's equity in the marital estate, his equity in the 
marital abode, as a means of satisfying the child support 
obligation when it is anticipated that his entire share of the 
estate will be consumed by the set-offs before he is released 
from incarceration and able to be gainfully employed? 
3. Whether the Trial Court's method of satisfying the 
child support obligation resulted in a punishment for his 
criminal conduct for which he is presently serving a sentence of 
imprisonment? 
1 
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4. Whether the District Court was statutorily bound to 
make an equitable division of the marital estate, and whether the 
decree actually results in an equitable division of that estate? 
5. Whether the Court erred when it set the amount of 
support per child at the sum of $87 per child when such amount 
was that suggested for three children by the Court1s uniform 
support scheudle, and support was awarded at that level for four 
children? 
STATUTES DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL 
30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated, 1985. 
(1) "When a decree of divorce is rendered, the Court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the 
children, property, and parties...." 
78-45-3 Duty of Man, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
(2) "Every man shall support his child; and he shall support his 
wife when she is in need." 
78-45-4 Duty of Woman, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
(3) "Every woman shall support her child; and she shall support 
her husband when he is in need." 
30-2-9 Family Expenses, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
(4) "The expenses of the family and the education of the 
children are chargable upon the property of both husband and 
2 
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wife or of either of them, and in relation thereto they may 
be sued jointly or separately." 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND THE FACTS 
The parties were married in Tooele City and Tooele County, 
Utah on April 23, 1971. (T. 21). There were four minor children 
as issue of the marriage: Treasa Proctor, born November 18, 
1971, age 16; Andrew Proctor, born January 8, 1976, age 12; Lori 
Proctor, born December 5, 1982, age 5; and Christopher Proctor, 
born October 11, 1983, age 4. 
Defendant was convicted on October 14, 1986 (T. 43, 24-25) 
of Rape of a Child (his oldest daughter, Treasa), (T 58, 22-25), 
a first degree felony, pursuant to a plea of guilty to charge 
voluntarily entered by the defendant. Since October 16, 1986, he 
has been in the care and custody of the Department of 
Corrections, and has been housed at the Duschesne County Jail. 
(T. 32, 7-9) Defendant's motion for reconsideration of sentence 
was denied on January 14, pursuant to an order entered January 
21, 1987 in criminal number CR86-082 of the Third District Court 
for Tooele County. He was given a minimum mandatory prison 
sentence of five years. (T. 32, 23-25). 
The planitiff brought an action for divorce on January 30, 
1988, which included a request for an equitable division of the 
personal property and real property acquired during the marriage 
as well as an order for the payment of child support. 
The trial was held on November 13, 1987 before the Honorable 
3 
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wife or of either of them, and in relation thereto they may 
be sued jointly or separately." 
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has been in the care and custody of the Department of 
Corrections, and has been housed at the Duschesne County Jail. 
(T. 32, 7-9) Defendant's motion for reconsideration of sentence 
was denied on January 14, pursuant to an order entered January 
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Timothy R. Hanson, who was then presiding in the Third District 
Court in and for Tooele County, State of Utah. A pretrial was 
previously held on October 13, 1987. 
At the time of trial the plaintiff, Margie R. Proctor, was 
working two (2) part-time jobs and receiving financial assistance 
from her chruch who was paying her utilities and providing her 
and the four (4) children with food. (T. 46, 13-25) 
The plaintiff argued that the Court should consider the 
assets, liquid and nonliquid, of the defendant, even though 
incarcerated, in determining what a reasonable amount of child 
support should be ordered payable to the plaintiff. The only 
viable asset of the defendant was his share of the equity awarded 
to him out of the marital assets. (T. 44, 15-25; T. 45, 1-7) 
The plaintiff further argued that even though the defendant, 
because he was incarcerated, had no "monthly cash flow11 to speak 
of he still had separate assets which the Court could consider in 
determining a child support order. (T. 46, 1-10; T. 55, 9-21) 
The Court did determine that the defendant did have a 
statutory duty to support his children and that the defendant did 
have the equitable means to satisfy that obligation. The Court 
set the child support amount pursuant to the defendant's last 
wage rate prior to being incarcerated; that being $7.96 per hour. 
(T. 51, 18-25; T. 52, 1-8; T. 67, 13-24) 
According to the uniform child support schedule adopted 
pursuant to §78-45-7, U.C.A., 1953, the Court ordered the 
defendant to pay $73 per month per child and when the oldest 
4 
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child reached the age of 18, then the defendant was to pay $87 
per month per child for the remaining three (3) children. 
After awarding the defendant a 50% share of the equity in 
the house, the Court further ordered that the amounts which 
accrued pursuant to this order would be deducted from the 
defendant's share of the equity in the house. (T. 62, 1-3; T. 63, 
1-21) 
The defendant's appeal primarily seeks to reverse the 
Court's order establishing an amount payable for child support 
during his incarceration and he also appeals the order off-
setting the amounts of accrued child support against his share of 
the equity in the house while he is incarcerated. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I: When a person has a duty to pay child support, 
even though he or she has no appreciable "cash 
flow" but does have separate and independent 
assets or property, these assets and properties 
may be used by the court in fashioning an 
equitable order to discharge the legal obligation 
to pay child support. 
POINT II: The trial court permitted the plaintiff the offset 
any accrued child support against the 
defendant's share of the equity in the house as a 
means of satisfying the defendant's legal 
obligation of support. This is not a "punishment" 
directed against the defendant because of his 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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criminal conduct. 
POINT III: The trial court equally divided the real property 
and the division of personal property was 
primarily stipulated to by the parties. Therefore, 
the trial court obviously did not use "fault11 in 
determining the division of the property. 
POINT IV: The trial court did make an equitable division 
of the marital estate. After doing so, the trial 
court allowed the plaintiff the right to offset 
any amounts of child support which may accrue 
against his share of the equity in the house. 
This is in an abuse of discretion and under the 
circumstances was equitable in relation to the 
parties and the children. 
POINT V: The plaintiff agrees that the Decree of Divorce 
should be amended to correctly state the trial 
court's order concerning the monthly amounts of 
child support. That the correct monthly amount is 
$72.00 per month per child, to be increased to 
$83.00 per month per child after the oldest child 
turns eighteen years of age. 
POINT VI: The plaintiff requests that the court award to 
her the reasonable costs and attorney fees 
incurred in this appeal. 
6 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I " 
CHILD SUPPORT SHOULD BE REQUIRED OF LARRY PROCTOR EVEN 
IF HE IS IN PRISON PROVIDING HE HAS SUFFICIENT ASSETS, 
It is the legal duty of a father and a mother to support 
their children. 
78-45-3 Duty of Man, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
"Every man shall support his child; and he shall support his 
wife when she is in need.11 
78-45-4 Duty of Woman, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
"Every woman shall support her child; and she shall support 
her husband when he is in need." 
The law in the State of Utah has charged the courts with 
determining how this legal obligation is satisfied based upon an 
equitable test. 
It is not uncommon or unconscionable to order child support 
where the facts and circumstances dictate that it is "equitable" 
to do so even though the person so ordered has no appreciable 
monthly cash flow. The state statute governing these situations 
is §30-3-5 which states as follows: 
"When a decree of divorce is rendered, the Court may include 
in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, and 
parties...." (Emphasis added.) 
This statute does not require that persons subject to paying 
child support must haved a monthly income or some kind of cash 
flow before the court can make a child support order. 
In fact, in Spangler v Spangler, 561 P.2nd 1076 (Utah 1977), 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the father who was unemployed and had no assets to speak of was 
still ordered to pay $75 per month child support, which was to be 
increased when the father's income reached a certain amount. 
In the present case, it is admitted that the defendant has 
no monthly cash flow because he is incarcerated; but he does have 
assets, i.e., his share of the equity in the house which amounts 
to $17,132.50, 
The defendant will be in jail for the next five (5) years. 
He will pay nothing in legal tender to the plaintiff for child 
support during this time, unless the court makes some equitable 
order under the facts and circumstances of this case. If no 
equitable order is entered concerning child support, the 
plaintiff will be providing 100% of the financial obligation to 
raise and provide the necessities for the parties four (4) minor 
children. The plaintiff is working two part-time jobs and is 
still being subsidized by her church who is paying for food for 
the plaintiff and the children and paying for the household 
utilities. 
Is it equitable the the plaintiff should continue, under the 
circumstances, making the house payment of $646 per month during 
the time the defendant is in jail; thereby preserving his 
financial interest while he is in jail, when he pays virtually no 
support to the plaintiff or the four children? 
In fact, at trial the defendant objected to paying anything 
towards the children's support while he was in jail. (T. 41, 15-
25; T. 42, 1-12; T. 52, 9-15) 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defendant states in his brief at page 10: 
"Defendant submits that while he would gladly support 
his children if he were able, present circumstances do 
not permit it.. .." 
The evidence at trial was just the opposite: See pages 65, 
66, and 67 of the transcript: 
"You cannot escape a duty to support a child where you 
have an independent source of assets. I also think that 
one of the reasons that the court reaches this result 
is the defendant's own statements here today. I was 
frankly quite surprised when Mr. White put the question 
to the defendant that if this home were sold, and there 
was just a separate and distinct cash fund available to 
support these children, that Mr. Proctor said that he 
would not want his children suported out of that fund." 
(underlining added) 
The law in the State of Utah also provides that the separate 
property of both the father and mother is chargable for the 
payment of the children's necessary expenses. 
30-2-9 Family Expenses, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
"The expenses of the family and the education of the 
children are chargable upon the property of both husband and 
wife or of either of them, and in relation thereto they may 
be sued jointly or separately." 
Therefore, when a person has a duty to pay child support, 
even though he or she has no appreciable "cash flow" but does 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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have separate and independent assets or property, these assets or 
property may be used by the court in fashioning an equitable 
order to discharge the legal obligation to pay child support. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DEDUCTING THE COURT 
ORDERED CHILD SUPPORT FROM LARRY PROCTOR'S EQUITY IN 
THE HOUSE NOR DID IT IMPOSE A PUNISHMENT ON HIM. 
The defendant argues that the trail court imposed a 
"punishment" upon him by allowing the plaintiff to offset 
accruing child support payments against the defendant1s share of 
equity in the house. See page 11 of Defendant's Brief. Nothing 
could be further from the truth; nor did the trial court "mix the 
defendant's child support obligation with the division of the 
marital estate" as stated on page 11 of the Defendant's Brief. 
Furthermore, the trial court did not set the amount of child 
support based upon the defendant's share of the marital asset. 
The monthly child support amount was established by using the 
defendant's rate of compensation at this employment prior to 
being incarcerated, that being $7.96 per hour. (T. 41, 2; 67, 
13-25; 68, 1-9.) Hence, the amount of the marital estate had 
nothing to do with the amount of the monthly child support 
established by the trial court. 
The trial court did permit the plaintiff to offset accrued 
child support against the defendant's share of the equity in the 
house as a means to satisfy the defendant's legal obligation of 
support. This is not a punishment against the defendant. (T. 68, 
21-25; 69, 1-10.) 
10 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT USE FAULT AS A BASIS FOR THE 
DIVISION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE. 
The trial court at no time used "fault" as its basis for 
division of the marital assets. In fact, the plaintiff and 
defendant each received 50% of the equity of the parties house 
which was acquired during the marriage. The equity in the house 
was determined by a certified appraiser, stipulated to by the 
parties, who determined that the house had a fair market value of 
$85,000 with the outstanding mortgage of $50,375. (T. 61, 7-25; 
62, 1-4.) 
An equal division of the real property to each party does 
not evidence a "spirit of revenge" by the trial court argued by 
opposing counsel at page 14 of the Defendant's Brief. An equal 
division of the real property can only evidence a clearly 
objective determination free of any consideration of "fault" or 
"revenge", notwithstanding the heinous crimes committed by the 
defendant against his own child; therefore, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion and this ruling must be upheld. Turner 
v. Turner, 649 P.2d. 6 (Utah, 1982) states the "trial courts 
apportionment of marital property between parties will not be 
disturbed by the Supreme Court on appeal unless there is such a 
minifest injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of 
discretion." 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID MAKE AN EQUITABLE DIVISION OF THE 
MARITAL ESTATE PURSUANT TO §30-3-5(1). 
The defendant continues to confuse the legal difference 
between an equitable division of the marital property and the 
court1s order to permit the plaintiff the right to offset what 
she should be receiving each month in child support payments. 
The defendant was awarded 50% of the equity in the house which 
the plaintiff suggests is "equitable". 
The defendant is forgetting that the plaintiff is providing 
100% of the actual financial support of herself and the children 
and will do so for the next five (5) years. It would be 
inequitable and unjust to allow the courts in effect to perserve 
the defendant's separate share of assets and hold them safe, as 
it were, and to protect them from any legal claim while the 
defendant is in jail. The law imposes no such privileges on its 
citizens, whether they are in jail or not. 
The trial court also stated that should the defendant be 
released from jail or find some other way to pay the child 
support that this order would be reviewed at that time and 
modified accordingly, if need be. (T. 68, 13-20.) 
The trial court first equally divided the marital estate and 
secondly awarded the plaintiff the right to receive child support 
and thirdly gave the plaintiff right to offset accruing amounts 
of child support against the defendant1s separate and individual 
property interest. The defendant would have the Appellate Court 
believe that the process of offsetting the defendant's obligation 
12 
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of child support amounts to an unequal and unfair division of the 
marital assets; thus, "depriving" him of his share of the 
equitable estate. The plaintiff suggests that the right of 
offset is equitable, because the defendant has assets but not the 
ability to make a cash payment each month to support the 
children. Pinney v. Pinney, 245 P. 329 (Utah 1926) and Dahlberg 
v. Dahlberg, 292 P. 214 (Utah 1930). 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SETTING THE CHILD 
SUPPORT AT $87 PER MONTH PER CHILD AND THE TRIAL COURT 
IS NOT MANDATORILY REQUIRED TO SET THE CHILD SUPPORT 
AMOUNT AT THE RATE SUGGESTED BY THE UNIFORM CHILD 
SUPPORT SCHEDULE. 
The plaintiff agrees that the decree of divorce should be 
amended in respect to the monthly amount ordred by the trial 
court. The correct monthly amount per child should be $73 for a 
total monthly support order of $292. When the oldest child 
reaches the age of 18 or graduates from high school, which ever 
is later, then the child support is $87 per month per child for 
the remaining three (3) children. (T. 72, 2-6; 73, 1-7.) 
The is no legal mandate that the trial court set the child 
support obligation at the amount listed in the Uniform Child 
Support Schedule. The court should take into consideration all 
relevant factors in setting the child support order. 
POINT VI 
THE PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT REQUESTS THAT THE COURT OF 
APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH AWARD HER PAYMENT OF HER 
REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED IN RESPONDING TO THIS 
APPEAL. 
The plaintiff requests that she be compensated for 
13 
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reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred in having to respond 
to this appeal based upon her lack of ability to pay and due to 
her financial condition. That this issue should either be 
decided by the Appellate Court or remanded to the Trial Court for 
a hearing and a finding as to reasonable costs and attorney fees. 
(T. 69, 11-22.) Peterson v Peterson 189 P.2d. 961 (Utah 1948) 
and Hendricks v. Hendricks 65 P.2d. 642 (Utah 1937). 
CONCLUSION 
The marital assets of the parties were equitably divided by 
the trial court pursuant to §30-3-5, U.C.A. 1953. There were 
some special circumstances in this case which the trial court 
gave due consideration to in its deliberations. In particular, 
the fact that the defendant was incarcerated in jail for five (5) 
years and that the defendant did have separate and independent 
assets in which to offset an accruing reasonable child support 
order. 
The defendant was deprived of no assets and was fairly and 
justly dealt with by the trial court in every respect. The real 
property owned by the parties was divided 50% to each party. The 
personal property was basically stipulated to by the parties at 
the time of trial. The trial court making little, if any, 
decisions as to the division of the personal property. 
Therefore, it is respectfully requested that the Appellate 
Court affirm the Trial Court decision and grant an award of 
reasonable attorney fees and costs to the plaintiff which were 
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incurred in this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D9OGLAB F. WHITE 
ttor(/ey for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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